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CORPORATE LAW OR THE LAW OF 
BUSINESS?:  STAKEHOLDERS AND 





Corporate law is said to be witnessing “the end of history.”1  The long battle be-
tween the conservative, private, shareholder-wealth-maximization school of corporate 
legal thought and the progressive, public, stakeholder-protection/social-responsibility 
school is now over.2  The victor, it is claimed, is the conservative school, also known 
as the “nexus-of-contracts” approach,3 which holds that corporations should be run for 
the exclusive benefit of shareholders (what is often termed “shareholder primacy”).  
To contractarians, the state’s role in corporate governance is primarily to provide effi-
cient default rules from which shareholders can choose to depart,4 and the few manda-
tory legal rules that do exist to restrain corporate behavior are subject to evasion by 
choice of form.5  The terms of corporate activity are thus effectively set by markets, 
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 1. See Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The End of History for Corporate Law, 89 GEO. L.J. 439 
(2001). 
 2. A detailed overview of these two schools of corporate legal thought is provided in David Millon, Fron-
tiers of Legal Thought: Theories of the Corporation, 1990 DUKE L.J. 201. 
 3. A sampling of influential works: FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC 
STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW (1991); NICHOLAS WOLFSON, THE MODERN CORPORATION: FREE MARKETS 
VERSUS REGULATION (1984); Henry Butler, The Contractual Theory of the Corporation, 11 GEO. MASON U. L. 
REV. 99 (1989); William A. Klein, The Modern Business Organization: Bargaining Under Constraints, 91 
YALE L. J. 1521 (1982). 
 4. See generally Henry N. Butler & Larry E. Ribstein, Opting Out of Fiduciary Duties: A Response to the 
Anti-Contractarians, 65 WASH. L. REV. 1 (1990) (arguing that private contract, not government regulation, will 
dictate the most efficient set of corporate laws). 
 5. See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Community and Statism: A Conservative Contractarian Critique of Pro-
gressive Corporate Law Scholarship, 82 CORNELL L. REV. 856, 860-61 (1997) (arguing that “mandatory rules 
are often subject to evasion by choice of form and jurisdiction”). 
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not by law.6  Progressive corporate law, with its preference for state-imposed manda-
tory rules to limit excessive pursuit of profit and its promotion of employee, customer, 
and community voice in corporate governance,7 has been vanquished.8  Even progres-
sive corporate lawyers bemoan the end of corporate law’s history; they concede that 
shareholder primacy—not the interests of employees, consumers, or larger communi-
ties—has come to dictate corporate practice at the dawn of the twenty-first century.9 
Are the reports of progressive corporate law’s demise exaggerated?  This article 
offers a legal history of how the progressive-inspired ideals of stakeholder protection 
and corporate social responsibility through mandatory legal rules have shaped the law 
affecting corporations.  This history uncovers two patterns in progressive corporate 
law reform, discussed in Part II, both of which caution against a rush to declare the ul-
timate triumph of shareholder primacy.10 
The first pattern is that progressive ideals have, in fact, successfully influenced 
several important areas of corporate law, such as the allowance of charitable giving 
and the adoption of constituency statutes, which allow management to protect non-
shareholder constituencies even at the expense of shareholders.  These victories, how-
ever, have had notably mixed results.  While corporate charitable giving generates 
large wealth transfers from firms to non-profits, it is achieved through expanded 
managerial discretion that permits self-dealing and opportunism in allocation deci-
sions.  Constituency statutes have also expanded managerial discretion, making stake-
holder protection a matter of choice, not legal obligation.  To the extent progressive 
ideals have come to be reflected in corporate law, it has come at the cost of increasing 
the potential for managerial opportunism. 
The second pattern reveals the vibrancy of stakeholder protection and corporate 
social responsibility outside of “corporate law.”  While some progressives have at-
tempted to protect stakeholders by changing corporate law, others have looked to 
 
 6. See Bernard Black, Is Corporate Law Trivial?: A Political and Economic Analysis, 84 NW. U. L. REV. 
542 (1990) (arguing that corporate law consists mainly of negotiable default rules and that the extant mandatory 
rules are subject to easy evasion). 
 7. See generally RALPH NADER, MARK GREEN & JOEL SELIGMAN, TAMING THE GIANT CORPORATION 
(1976); PROGRESSIVE CORPORATE LAW (Lawrence Mitchell ed., 1991). 
 8. See Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 1, at 439 (“There is no longer any serious competitor to the 
view that corporate law should principally strive to increase long-term shareholder value.”). 
 9. See Dalia Tsuk, Corporations Without Labor: The Politics of Progressive Corporate Law, 151 U. PA. 
L. REV. 1861, 1867 (2003) (arguing that progressives’ ideological opposition to class led to the blossoming of 
“a vision of the corporation that focused on the interests of shareholders vis-à-vis managers ultimately to the 
exclusion of all other corporate constituencies”); Millon, supra note 2, at 228-29 (shareholder primacy has “de-
fined the boundaries within which serious debate . . . [can take] place”). 
 10. The end-of-history claim is also subject to challenge on the ground that prevailing corporate law norms 
make directors, not shareholders, primary.  It is the directors who are invested with discretion over virtually all 
corporate decisions, and the prevailing “Wall Street Rule” offers shareholders little more than the opportunity to 
sell their shares.  See generally Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy: The Means and Ends of Corporate 
Governance, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 547 (2003) (arguing for director primacy in corporate law).  See also Lynn A. 
Stout & Margaret Blair, A Team Production Theory of Corporate Law, 85 VA. L. REV. 247, 253 (1999) (pro-
posing that directors of public corporations exist to protect not shareholders per se, but all of a firm’s stake-
holders); G. Mitu Gulati, William A. Klein & Eric M. Zolt, Connected Contracts, 47 UCLA L. REV. 887, 895 
(2000) (challenging the notion of shareholder primacy by focusing on the interrelation of other corporate par-
ticipants). 
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other legal regimes to regulate corporate behavior.  From securities and labor law re-
forms in the New Deal to the social welfare laws of the 1960s and 1970s, progressives 
have advocated for a diverse and broad array of mandatory legal rules designed to 
limit corporate conduct perceived as harmful to non-shareholder constituencies.  
These various bodies of law—what might be termed the “law of business”—reflect 
progressive principles of stakeholder protection and, though outside of corporate law, 
are powerful forces shaping the choices available to corporate management concern-
ing basic operational and organizational decisions: whom to hire, fire, and promote; 
which products to produce and how best to produce them; how to set up the work-
place; and how to allocate and invest firm assets.  All of these decisions are made un-
der the mandatory legal rules embodied in employment and labor law, workplace 
safety law, environmental law, consumer protection law, and pension law.  Such rules, 
because they often apply to all businesses, are not susceptible to easy evasion through 
choice of form.  As a result, those charged with governing a corporation find their de-
cision tree considerably trimmed and their discretion decidedly diminished by manda-
tory legal rules enacted in the name of protecting stakeholders. 
That the recognition of these two patterns has implications for both progressive 
corporate law reformers and for proponents of shareholder primacy is argued in Part 
III.  For progressives, these patterns suggest a direction for orienting their efforts to 
reform corporations for the benefit of stakeholders.  Rather than try to change corpo-
rate law—which, in the past, has often meant expanded managerial discretion and 
mixed results for stakeholders—progressives might be better off attempting to protect 
stakeholders through the broader law of business.  The legal foundations for protect-
ing stakeholders, and the willingness to use mandatory legal rules in their service, are 
already in place outside of corporate law and provide strong footing upon which to 
build.  The direction recommended by this history may be especially useful now that 
we are again confronted with the possibility of corporate reform in the wake of the 
Enron, WorldCom, and Tyco scandals. 
With regard to shareholder primacy, the historical patterns of progressive corpo-
rate reform show that claims of victory for shareholders over stakeholders depend on 
an artificially narrow view of the law affecting corporate management.  What is com-
monly termed corporate law—the law bound together in state corporations codes or 
corporate law treatises—is not alone in shaping corporate governance.  Stakeholders 
exert their voice through legal mechanisms adopted largely outside of corporate law.  
Indeed, contractarians themselves have recognized this, arguing that one reason to ex-
clude stakeholders from corporate law is their protection in the broader law of busi-
ness.  Stakeholder success outside of corporate law indicates the limited significance 
of any claimed victory of shareholders over stakeholders within corporate law.  Vic-
tory for shareholders on the battlefield of corporate law should not be mistaken for 
victory in the larger legal war over corporate social responsibility and stakeholder pro-
tection.  That larger war is occurring on numerous other battlefields—from employ-
ment law to environmental law—and the battles are more closely contested than 
claims about the end of history imply. 
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Whatever its explanatory power in corporate law, shareholder primacy is far from 
an accurate description of the law of business or of corporate practice.  After a century 
of regulation outside of corporate law, progressives have found numerous ways to en-
hance the social responsibility of corporations and protect the workers, consumers, 
and communities affected by corporate behavior.  Free market principles and share-
holder primacy have not won the day; they exist in corporate law alongside the many 
other areas of the law of business that do interfere with the free market and restrain 
corporate management in the interests of corporate stakeholders. 
II 
A BRIEF HISTORY OF PROGRESSIVE LEGAL REFORM OF CORPORATIONS 
A. Securities and Labor Law Reform in the New Deal 
In the first decades of the twentieth century, a progressive cohort formed to com-
bat the radical transformations in corporate law that began in the late 1800s.  Those 
changes formalized what we now refer to as the separation of ownership from control 
in modern corporations.  Typical nineteenth century corporations were owned by indi-
viduals, small groups, or families who also managed the firm’s daily operations.11  
Significant corporate law reforms taking hold around the turn of the century included 
the allowance of holding companies,12 the demise of the doctrines of ultra vires and 
quo warranto,13 the adoption of general incorporation laws and the business judgment 
rule,14 the watering down of shareholder inspection rights,15 and the diminishment of 
shareholder voting power.16  These corporate law reforms loosened the traditional 
bonds that secured managerial decisionmaking to shareholder interests and caused 
corporate lawyers to fret that increased managerial autonomy and weakened owner 
oversight would lead to self-dealing and opportunistic behavior by professional man-
agers.  In 1894, William Cook, the author of a corporate law treatise widely used 
around the turn of the century, wrote that developments in corporate law were permit-
 
 11. ADOLF A. BERLE JR. & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY 
4 (rev. ed. 1991). 
 12. See Morton J. Horwitz, Santa Clara Revisited: The Development of Corporate Theory, 88 W. VA. L. 
REV. 173, 195 (1985) (arguing that New Jersey’s 1889 regulation of holding companies marked the end to the 
use of corporate law to prevent consolidation). 
 13. When a corporation was a special franchise from the state, the government could bring a quo warranto 
action against it for nonfeasance.  The courts began to depart from this doctrine in the 1870s.  The substantive 
doctrine of ultra vires forbade the corporation to exceed the corporation’s authority.  See Herbert Hovenkamp, 
The Classical Corporation in American Legal Thought, 76 GEO. L.J. 1593, 1658-64 (1988). 
 14. See id. at 1667-69 (describing the rise of the business judgment rule). 
 15. See ARTHUR W. MACHEN JR., A TREATISE ON THE MODERN LAW OF CORPORATIONS WITH 
REFERENCE TO FORMATION AND OPERATION UNDER GENERAL LAWS 892-94 (1908) (noting that a shareholder 
can only inspect the corporation’s books if he can make a prima facie case of fraud or mismanagement). 
 16. See Horwitz, supra note 12, at 200-02 (describing the demise of the rule of unanimous consent, which 
was required for fundamental changes in the nineteenth century). 
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ting managers to turn modern firms into “efficient instruments of fraud, speculation, 
plunder and illegal gain.”17  Laissez-faire allowed management to do too much. 
The fear of managerial corruption was only strengthened in the decades after 
Cook’s treatise: the New York Life Insurance scandal of 1905 prompted widespread 
reforms in the organizational structure of insurance corporations,18 the Pujo Commis-
sion investigations of 1912-13 detailed widespread mismanagement in Wall Street 
firms,19 and the Crash of 1929 convinced even holdouts of the need for more oversight 
of corporate management. In 1932, the well-publicized Pecora Hearings in Congress 
collected irrefutable evidence of market manipulation by corporate officers and in-
vestment bankers.20 
Progressive lawyers, including Louis Brandeis, Felix Frankfuter, and Adolf Berle, 
vigorously condemned the unbridled authority corporate managers were able to exer-
cise over investors.  Ownership and control, as detailed most famously in Berle and 
Means’ 1932 The Modern Corporation and Private Property,21 had been pushed far 
apart.  The absence of effective oversight over corporate leaders, Brandeis argued, led 
to an unhealthy concentration of wealth and corrupt manipulation of markets.22  
Shareholders were not the only ones harmed; employees were left jobless and con-
sumers were left without goods.  In the wake of the stock market crash and the atten-
dant collapse of the economy, one could not avoid the conclusion that corporations 
were more than private investment vehicles for shareholders: they had an impact on 
“whole districts, . . . bring[ing] ruin to one community and prosperity to another.”23  
Firms, according to Berle and Means, brought together “workers, consumers, and 
suppliers of capital,”24 giving rise to “new responsibilities towards the owners, the 
workers, the consumers, and the State [that] thus rest upon the shoulders of those in 
control.”25 
Although some argued in favor of reforming corporate law—Berle and Means, for 
example, sought to reorient officers’ fiduciary duties to promote public ends26—
progressives were busy creating a whole new body of law to protect against corporate 
excess.  The key to harnessing the market without reigning in economic growth, ac-
cording to Brandeis, was transparency; corporations ought to be required to disclose 
 
 17. WILLIAM W. COOK, A TREATISE ON STOCK AND STOCKHOLDERS, BONDS, MORTGAGES, AND 
GENERAL CORPORATION LAW 896 (3d ed. 1894). 
 18. See MARK J. ROE, STRONG MANAGERS, WEAK OWNERS: THE POLITICAL ROOTS OF AMERICAN 
CORPORATE FINANCE 63-78 (1994). 
 19. See LOUIS D. BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE’S MONEY: AND HOW THE BANKERS USE IT 1-2, 12-15, 47 
(1914). 
 20. Cynthia A. Williams, The Securities and Exchange Commission and Corporate Social Transparency 
112 HARV. L. REV. 1197, 1223-26 (1999). 
 21. BERLE & MEANS, supra note 11. 
 22. See BRANDEIS, supra note 19, at 62-63, 69-72 (arguing that disclosure, or “publicity,” is necessary to 
reform excessive wealth concentration and corrupt opportunism in finance). 
 23. BERLE & MEANS, supra note 11, at 46. 
 24. Id. at 349. 
 25. Id. at 7. 
 26. Id. at 311-12 (arguing that owners have surrendered control over their investments, controlling manag-
ers have insufficient claim to control, and the “community” has “paramount interests” to which other interests 
must yield). 
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their financial dealings to the market.27  Disclosure would help shareholders, but it 
would also help bring public pressure to bear on corporations.  Analogizing disclosure 
to sunlight, Brandeis thought its presence would go far in disinfecting corporate eth-
ics.28  Responsible for overseeing the enactment of the Securities Act, Frankfurter 
drew inspiration from Brandeis and promoted disclosure to discourage managerial 
fraud and to enable a measure of social control over corporate activity.29  Firms had 
multiple stakeholders, and shareholders were thought to be a proxy to protect those 
larger interests.  The Act’s legislative history, and that of its companion, the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934,30 reflect these progressive concerns.  Corporate officials were 
expected to act as trustees for investors, a principle stemming from state law fiduciary 
duties but now requiring extra-corporate law regulation.  Moreover, the public was 
clearly an intended beneficiary of the drafters’ efforts;31 they too would be protected 
by a regime of managerial restraints imposed from the outside. 
Although some perceived the securities laws as hostile to large corporations,32 the 
rise of these legal regimes legitimated large firms by reducing the dangers to public 
investment in corporate stock, thus encouraging the flow of capital from individuals to 
firms through reliable, transparent markets.  To mainstream progressives, the large 
corporation was not inherently evil, but the concentrated economic power of top ex-
ecutives that came with it needed to be disciplined by shareholders to the benefit of 
other corporate stakeholders.  As a result, the large corporation was not inhibited in its 
growth.  Instead, the markets for corporate securities were rendered more transparent, 
the information flowing to the market from firm management was less misleading, 
and corporate business became more stable for workers, consumers, and creditors. 
The New Deal involved other significant legal transformations designed to tame 
corporate power by curbing the autonomy of management and protecting stake-
holders, such as employees and consumers.  While consumers enjoyed the protections 
of federally guaranteed “fair” competition through the creation of the Federal Trade 
Commission, the employees gained security through labor law reforms.  The National 
Labor Relations Act,33 passed in 1935, gave workers a federal legal right to unionize 
and engage in collective bargaining, even against the will of their employers, who 
were now barred from interfering with such efforts.34  As Professor Dodd points out, 
“[i]t is plain that these regulations . . . involve important limitations on the right of 
 
 27. See Williams, supra note 20, at 1212-14. 
 28. See BRANDEIS, supra note 19, at 62 (“Sunlight is said to be the best of disinfectants[.]”). 
 29. See Williams, supra note 20, at 1221-22 (analyzing Frankfurter’s role in the Securities Act). 
 30. Pub. L. No. 73-291, 48 Stat. 881 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78mm (2000)).  For the 
1933 Act, see Pub. L. No. 73-22, 48 Stat. 74 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (2000)). 
 31. See generally Williams, supra note 20 (analyzing the legislative history of the Acts).  An even fuller 
account can be found in JOEL SELIGMAN, THE TRANSFORMATION OF WALL STREET: A HISTORY OF THE 
SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION AND MODERN CORPORATE FINANCE (1982). 
 32. See Hovenkamp, supra note 13, at 1685. 
 33. National Labor Relations Act, ch. 372, §1, 49 Stat. 449 (1935) (current version at 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-66 
(2004)). 
 34. See LAWRENCE FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 665 (2d ed. 1985). 
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stockholders and managers acting in their interests to treat the enterprise as the private 
property”35 of stockholders. 
The evolution of the common law further curtailed employer discretion.  Under 
the doctrine of master and servant, employees enjoyed few protections from their em-
ployers’ “absolute right of discharge” that served to anchor managerial control over 
wages, hours, and nearly all other workplace matters.36  By the end of the New Deal, 
however, the law had transformed an employee into “an entity separate from the mas-
ter, and potentially self-determining”37 inside the employment relationship.  With the 
old order broken down, “private industry was exposed to the diverse intrusions that 
would characterize relations between business and government in succeeding decades: 
minimum wages, equal employment measures, occupational health and safety, plant-
closing laws.”38 
In all, the progressive impulse pushed through a remarkable array of legislation 
outside of corporate law that nevertheless imposed non-trivial limitations on manage-
rial discretion.  Shareholders benefited in many ways, but they were not the only cor-
porate constituency to do so.  The new beneficiaries included consumers and, espe-
cially, employees—groups that continue to enjoy legal protections from managerial 
discretion as a result of New Deal legislation. 
B. Corporate Charity and Corporate Law 
The growth of large national corporations in the first decades of the twentieth cen-
tury made evident the impact that boardroom decisions had on diverse corporate 
stakeholders, including consumers and the larger communities dependent upon indus-
try.  One way to soften that impact was to encourage corporations to contribute some 
of their resources to charity.  Corporate law, however, traditionally prohibited charita-
ble contributions; such expenditures were ultra vires—beyond the powers of the cor-
poration—because they were designed to benefit the public at large rather than incor-
porators.39  Progressives argued successfully to reform corporate law and permit 
management to make charitable contributions. 
In his famous 1932 debate with Adolf Berle, published in the Harvard Law Re-
view, E. Merrick Dodd called for the expansion of corporate fiduciary duties to pro-
tect the interests and needs of the whole society, not just shareholders.40  Dodd be-
lieved that firms were required to adopt policies benefiting employees, consumers, 
 
 35. E. Merrick Dodd, Jr., For Whom Are Corporate Managers Trustees?, 45 HARV. L. REV. 1145, 1150 
(1932). 
 36. KAREN ORREN, BELATED FEUDALISM: LABOR, THE LAW, AND LIBERAL DEVELOPMENT IN THE 
UNITED STATES 176 (1991). 
 37. Id. at 161. 
 38. Id. at 210. 
 39. See Millon, supra note 2, at 218. 
 40. See Dodd, supra note 35, at 1148 (noting that corporations have a social service, as well as a profit-
making, function).  For Berle’s contribution, see A.A. Berle Jr., Corporate Powers as Powers in Trust, 44 
HARV. L. REV. 1049 (1931); For Whom Corporate Managers are Trustees: A Note, 45 HARV. L. REV. 1365 
(1932) [hereinafter “Note”]. 
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and the broader community, even at the expense of profits.41  His argument was not 
purely normative; in the wake of the crash of 1929, the public demanded that much, 
and corporate executives themselves subscribed to this capacious view of social re-
sponsibility.42 
Dodd’s view of corporate social responsibility was countered by a conservative 
philosophy of shareholder primacy espoused by Berle.43  Corporations, Berle argued, 
were merely investment vehicles managed exclusively in the interests of sharehold-
ers.44  Although Berle was sympathetic to Dodd’s objectives—as evidenced by his call 
for corporate law to be redirected to serve community interests in The Modern Corpo-
ration and Private Property45—they diverged in their understanding of current corpo-
rate law doctrine, with Berle insistent that shareholders alone held cognizable claims 
to fiduciary obligations at present.46  The shareholder primacy norm was determina-
tively articulated as a doctrinal rule of corporate law by the famous decision in Dodge 
v. Ford Motor Company.47  Criticizing Henry Ford’s “general purpose and plan to 
benefit mankind” by lowering prices and making cars available to the masses, the 
Michigan Supreme Court insisted that a “business corporation is organized and carried 
on primarily for the profit of stockholders” and that “[t]he powers of the directors are 
to be employed for that end.”48  Although management retained discretion over the 
“choice of means to attain that end,”49 fiduciary principles required them to work for 
the benefit of shareholders rather than for employees or the larger community. 
Professor David Millon, among others, concludes that Dodd’s view of corporate 
social responsibility was defeated by the conservative philosophy represented in 
Dodge.50  But if shareholder primacy has reigned supreme through much of the history 
of corporate law, at least one element of the progressive agenda did take root: the al-
lowance of corporate charity.  In 2000, corporations gave over ten billion dollars to 
charity, even though such giving has only the most tenuous connection to shareholder 
 
 41. See Dodd, supra note 35, at 1154-58. 
 42. See E. Merrick Dodd Jr., Is Effective Enforcement of the Fiduciary Duties of Corporate Managers 
Practicable?, 2 U. CHI. L. REV. 194, 206 (1934) (citing to the Address of Owen D. Young, January 1929, in 
JOHN H. SEARS, THE NEW PLACE OF THE STOCKHOLDER 209 (1929)). 
 43. See Berle, Note, supra note 40, at 1367 (arguing that one “can not abandon emphasis on ‘the view that 
business corporations exist for the sole purpose of making profits for their stockholders’” until an adequate sub-
stitute is found). 
 44. See id. 
 45. See BERLE & MEANS, supra note 11, at 311-12. 
 46. See Berle, Note, supra note 40, at 1367, 1370 (arguing that “responsibility to the community has not 
yet appeared”). 
 47. Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668 (Mich. 1919). 
 48. Id. at 684. 
 49. Id. 
 50. “[D]efenders of shareholder-centered, privatized vision of corporate activity in corporate law were able 
to defeat claims about corporate social responsibility.  At least until recently, this theory of the corporation has 
continued to wield that power.”  Millon, supra note 2, at 203.  This view was not shared by Berle, who reflected 
back twenty years later and concluded: “The argument has been settled (at least for the time being) squarely in 
favor of Professor Dodd’s contention.”  See Lynn A. Stout, Bad and Not-So-Bad Arguments for Shareholder 
Primacy, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 1189, 1209 (2002) (quoting ADOLF A. BERLE JR., THE 20TH CENTURY 
CAPITALIST REVOLUTION 169 (1954)). 
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interests.51  A startling recent example of such giving was the wave of corporations 
that gave huge contributions to the September 11 relief efforts.52  While a cynic might 
decry such spending as clever marketing or well-managed public relations, executives 
would be hard pressed to show that their brands were enhanced by their post-
September 11 gifts.  More importantly, executives would not even try to do so.  In-
stead, they would emphasize their explicit intent to benefit the community and the vic-
tims’ families rather than maintain that they were pursuing profit for shareholders dur-
ing a time of national mourning. 
Corporate charity remains formally tied to shareholder profit maximization.  
Companies account for charitable gifts as marketing expenses and courts may require 
executives to justify their contributions as being in the long run interests of the firm.  
The law on the books, however, is far from strict in its requirement of shareholder 
primacy.  Take the landmark corporate charity case found in every corporate law case-
book, A.P. Smith Manufacturing Co. v. Barlow,53 decided in 1953.  Upholding a fire 
hydrant and valve manufacturer’s donations to Princeton University, the New Jersey 
Supreme Court was willing to accept the extremely tenuous tie to shareholder interests 
offered by management—that the contribution would produce goodwill for the com-
pany.54  Even here, the meat of the court’s discussion focuses on the benefits to a 
broader community.  In an opinion laden with the fear of communism,55 the court con-
tended that corporate charity was necessary for the “vigor of . . . democratic institu-
tions.”56  “It seems to us,” the court wrote, “that just as the conditions prevailing when 
corporations were originally created required that they serve public as well as private 
interests, modern conditions require that corporations acknowledge and discharge so-
cial as well as private responsibilities as members of the communities within which 
they operate.”57 
Corporate charity still has some limits.  Nevertheless, those very limits suggest 
that corporate charity is permitted not because it helps shareholders but because it 
helps other corporate constituencies.  At mid-century, New Jersey adopted statutory 
corporate code provisions setting a ceiling for charitable contributions of one percent 
of firm capital.58  Current Delaware corporate law imposes a ceiling established by a 
“reasonableness”59 test; the courts hold contributions to be reasonable if the amount 
 
 51. Victor Brudney & Allen Ferrell, Management and Control of the Modern Business Corporation: Cor-
porate Speech and Citizenship: Corporate Charitable Giving, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1191, 1197 (2002). 
 52. See David Bank, Corporate Giving Fell 12% in ‘01 As Recession Took Toll on Charity, WALL ST. J., 
June 21, 2002, at B2 (noting that corporations gave over $400 million to September 11 relief funds in 2001, 
even as corporate charitable contributions fell overall). 
 53. A.P. Smith Mfg. Co. v. Barlow, 98 A.2d 581 (N.J. 1953). 
 54. Id. at 583. 
 55. Id. at 586 (the Court refers to “vicious . . . threats from abroad;” “if need be the matter may be viewed 
strictly in terms of actual survival of the corporation in a free enterprise system”). 
 56. Id. 
 57. Id. 
 58. 1930 N.J. Laws 105. 
 59. See Kahn v. Sullivan, 594 A.2d 48 (Del. 1991) (holding that federal tax law guides the determination 
of whether corporate charitable contributions are “reasonable”). 
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can be deducted under section 170 of the Internal Revenue Code,60 which allows con-
tributions of up to ten percent of pre-tax profits.61  Such limits make no sense from a 
shareholder-centered perspective.  If it is mandatory that charitable giving be in the 
interests of shareholders, why impose any ceilings at all?  Corporate law has no caps 
on marketing or public relations expenses; business judgment alone limits the alloca-
tion of firm resources for expenditures intended to benefit shareholders.  These legally 
imposed limits on corporate charity make sense only if current norms of corporate law 
recognize charitable giving to be for stakeholders other than shareholders. 
While the allowance of charitable contributions is an example of progressive im-
pulses taking hold in corporate law, it is also an example of the mixed results that oc-
cur when corporate law is reformed by expanding managerial discretion.  For all the 
social benefits that stem from billions in annual corporate charity—and they are pro-
found—corporate executives too often take liberties with corporate money and, in the 
name of charity, bestow benefits upon themselves.  Sponsorship of cultural institu-
tions and events, such as playhouses, museums, and operas, is perhaps the most com-
mon example.  Would this continue if executives no longer were given the front-row 
tickets that come with such generosity?62  More egregious examples are not hard to 
find.  Less than a mile from the author’s office is the Armand Hammer Museum and 
Cultural Center, built thanks to eighty-five million dollars in financing from the 
shareholders of Occidental Petroleum, the company controlled by Hammer.63  Ham-
mer had tried to place his personal art collection in the Los Angeles County Museum 
of Art, which objected to the Occidental Chairman’s insistence that a life-size likeness 
of him be displayed with the art permanently (among other onerous conditions on the 
gift).  Miffed, Hammer decided to build his own museum on the shareholders’ dime, 
although the resulting institution bears his own name and not that of the company.  
When the Delaware courts refused to intervene with construction of Hammer’s temple 
of opportunism, it became clear just how the cloak of charity could be used by corpo-
rate managers to pursue selfish objectives. 
Such mixed results should not come as a surprise.  Progressive corporate reform-
ers often tend to favor changing corporate law in ways that expand managerial discre-
tion.  Since shareholders exercise their influence through the capital markets, some 
think it is necessary to shield management from the dictates of stock valuation in order 
to allow management to show their concern for other constituents.  Expanding mana-
gerial discretion, however, inevitably risks managerial opportunism.  Freed from scru-
tiny, management can serve themselves—and they often do.  Corporate managers, it 
 
 60. Internal Revenue Code, 25 U.S.C. § 170(b)(2). 
 61. See Kahn, 594 A. 2d 48. 
 62. Sponsorships of cultural institutions should not be sold short.  They offer other benefits to executives, 
including access to social networks, prestige, and social standing.  See Faith Stevelman Kahn, Pandora’s Box: 
Managerial Discretion and the Problem of Corporate Philanthropy, 44 UCLA L. REV. 579, 615-19 (1997). 
 63. See Kahn, 594 A.2d, at 52-57.  The museum, which opened in 1990, has been managed by UCLA—the 
author’s employer—since 1994.  The museum’s history is available at 
http://www.hammer.ucla.edu/information_ about.htm. 
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seems, all too frequently resemble Oscar Wilde’s caricature of disciplinary weakness: 
“I can resist everything except temptation.”64 
C. Corporate Social Responsibility and Social Welfare Laws in the 1960s and 1970s 
In the 1960s and 1970s, progressives sought to reform the behavior of corpora-
tions by creating new legal regimes outside of corporate law.  This era saw an un-
precedented wave of what might be termed social welfare laws that were designed in 
part to benefit corporate stakeholders.  Unlike corporate law reforms, however, social 
welfare legislation of this period sought to cabin managerial discretion over important 
aspects of hiring, operations, and production.  Although this vast array of social wel-
fare legislation is not corporate law per se, it remains a vibrant constraint on manage-
rial decisionmaking, adopted in the name of non-shareholder constituencies of corpo-
rations.  While corporate lawyers tend to avoid discussing this broader law of 
business, any attempt to understand how the law shapes and controls corporate deci-
sionmaking will be incomplete without addressing social welfare legislation of this 
period. 
By the mid-1960s, critics of corporate social responsibility were vocal in con-
demning corporate law reforms allowing corporate charity and the larger pattern those 
reforms represented: the promotion of non-shareholder interests.  No critic was more 
vocal than University of Chicago economist Milton Friedman.  In Capitalism and 
Freedom, Friedman argued that claims that corporations should go “beyond serving 
the interest of their stockholders”65 were misguided.  He continued by stating, “there is 
one and only one social responsibility of business—to use its resources and engage in 
activities designed to increase its profits.”66  To Friedman—like the A.P. Smith Manu-
facturing67 court before him—nothing less than the survival of democracy was at 
stake: “Few trends could so thoroughly undermine the very foundations of our free 
society as the acceptance by corporate officials of a social responsibility other than to 
make as much money for their stockholders as possible.”68  But there was also a prac-
tical problem: profit maximization gave executives a clear direction in running their 
businesses, but how were they to define social responsibility?69 
To progressives, this problem was less of a concern in practice: corporate officials 
could first try to remedy the social problems caused by their own corporations.  As the 
“dominant nongovernmental institution,” the corporation bore “large responsibility for 
the quality and tone of American life,” argued Abram Chayes in 1959.70  Because of 
its broad social impact, only a distorted view of the firm would see shareholders as the 
 
 64. OSCAR WILDE, LADY WINDERMERE’S FAN 15 (1st Collected ed. 1969). 
 65. MILTON FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM 133 (1962); see also Milton Friedman, A Friedman 
Doctrine—The Social Responsibility of Business Is to Increase Its Profits, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 13, 1970 (Maga-
zine), at 33. 
 66. FRIEDMAN, supra note 65, at 133. 
 67. A.P. Smith Mfg. Co. v. Barlow, 98 A.2d 581 (N.J. 1953). 
 68. FRIEDMAN, supra note 65, at 133. 
 69. See id. 
 70. Abram Chayes, The Modern Corporation and the Rule of Law, in THE CORPORATION IN MODERN 
SOCIETY 25, 26-27 (Edward S. Mason ed., 1959). 
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sole constituency group.  “A more spacious conception of ‘membership,’ and one 
closer to the facts of corporate life, would include all those having a relation of suffi-
cient intimacy with the corporation or subject to its power in a sufficiently specialized 
way.”71  Some progressive corporate lawyers and activists sought to reward these con-
stituencies—employees, consumers, or the larger public—by reforming the internal 
mechanisms of corporate governance through codetermination,72 or exerting their 
voice through politically motivated proxy fights in corporate elections.73 
Despite these efforts, corporate governance mechanisms remained relatively im-
mune to non-shareholder constituencies.  But progressives recognized another way to 
empower employees, consumers, and the larger public: legislation outside of corporate 
law.  As Chayes noted, since the late nineteenth century “antitrust and public regula-
tion have, broadly speaking, been the characteristic response of American politics, 
government, and law to the problems posed by the modern corporation.”74  Employ-
ees—at least those which were unionized—had gained “a ‘say’ in the governance of 
the corporation” already, thanks to laws protecting collective bargaining.75 
Following this model, the late 1960s saw “an unprecedented wave of policy inno-
vation”76 in the form of social welfare—or quality of life—legislation, as Congress 
and state legislatures granted broad new protections to workers, consumers, and com-
munities harmed by big business.  According to Scott Bowman, “The apparent intran-
sigence and arrogance of certain corporations in refusing to acknowledge or remedy 
numerous problems associated with public health and safety had nurtured a growing 
public suspicion that corporations were not socially responsible.”77  Curtailing corpo-
rate executives’ discretion on whom to hire and promote, how to operate their ma-
chinery and equipment, and what products were safe to sell, the laws of this era 
amounted to “extensive restrictions on business freedom.”78  These laws were not part 
of corporate law, but they profoundly influenced corporate behavior nonetheless—and 
did so in the name of non-shareholder constituencies. 
Consumers were one stakeholder group increasingly in need of new legal protec-
tions from corporate managers.  Consumers, according to progressive Ralph Nader, 
were among those harmed directly by corporate irresponsibility.  Nader’s Unsafe At 
Any Speed—an exposé of built-in safety problems in cars—showed that consumers 
 
 71. Id. at 41. 
 72. “Codetermination” refers to corporate governance structures that give a formal role to labor, alongside 
of capital, in decision-making.  See Katharina Pistor, Codetermination: A Sociopolitical Model with Govern-
ance Externalities, in EMPLOYEES AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 163 (M. Blair & M. Roe eds., 1999). 
 73. See John J. Flynn, Corporate Democracy: Nice Work If You Can Get It, in CORPORATE POWER IN 
AMERICA 94, 104 (Ralph Nader & Mark J. Green, eds., 1973); DAVID VOGEL, FLUCTUATING FORTUNES: THE 
POLITICAL POWER OF BUSINESS IN AMERICA 95 (1989) (noting the use of proxy fights to reform corporate be-
havior in the public interest). 
 74. Chayes, supra note 70, at 37. 
 75. Id. at 41-42. 
 76. James Q. Wilson, American Politics, Then and Now, COMMENTARY, Feb. 1979, at 40. 
 77. SCOTT R. BOWMAN, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND AMERICAN POLITICAL THOUGHT: LAW, 
POWER, AND IDEOLOGY 143 (1996). 
 78. Deborah A. Ballam, The Evolution of the Government-Business Relationship in the United States: Co-
lonial Times to Present, 31 AM. BUS. L.J. 553, 635 (1994). 
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were vulnerable to cold calculations by automobile executives willing to sacrifice 
lives in the pursuit of profit.79  The ensuing harassment of Nader by General Motors 
caused a scandal, launched Nader’s career, resulted in congressional hearings, and 
eventually proved to be the opening of the era’s floodgate of regulation against corpo-
rate excesses.80  Between 1966 and 1972, federal laws were enacted that expanded 
consumers’ rights and limited companies’ ability to introduce into the market harmful 
products: the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Act, the Consumer Product Safety 
Act, the Poison Prevention in Packaging Act, the Fair Packaging and Labeling Act, 
the Federal Meat Inspection Act, the Child Protection Act, and the Flammable Fabrics 
Act, to list the most important.  These laws did not purport to change fiduciary duties.  
They protected consumers by taking off the table a whole range of options that corpo-
rate management had traditionally been within its lawful discretion to choose. 
Workers, too, gained expansive new protections from the potentially damaging ef-
fects of corporate management’s exercise of business judgment.  Reflecting concerns 
about the hazardous conditions of the workplace, Congress passed the Occupational 
Safety and Health Act (OHSA) in 1970.81  OSHA aimed to lessen the “mounting toll 
of industrial injuries”82 attributable to companies that, in the pursuit of profits for 
shareholders, sacrificed the health and lives of employees.  Also during this period, 
corporate business confronted new limitations on their hiring and promotion practices 
in the form of antidiscrimination laws barring companies from discriminating on the 
basis of race, sex, and religion.83 
This pattern of restricting corporate management through reforms enacted outside 
of corporate law also resulted in new protections for communities affected by corpo-
rate behavior.  The way to protect such communities was not through corporate law 
reforms, but through the implementation of, for example, environmental laws.  As the 
public awareness of the dangers associated with pollution grew, the blame was placed 
squarely on big business–the power, petroleum, chemical, and steel industries.  By 
1972, environmentalism had become a “national obsession”84 and Congress had 
passed the Water Pollution Control Act, the Federal Environmental Pesticide Control 
Act, the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970, and the Environmental Protection Act.  
This last law, enacted by unanimous vote, also created a strong, large federal regula-
tory agency charged with protecting the public health85 and authorized with “broad 
powers over a wide range of business decisions.”86 
 
 79. See RALPH NADER, UNSAFE AT ANY SPEED: THE DESIGNED-IN DANGERS OF THE AMERICAN 
AUTOMOBILE (1965). 
 80. See VOGEL, supra note 73, at 43-46. 
 81. 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-78 (1994). 
 82. VOGEL, supra note 73, at 84. 
 83. See, e.g., Civil Rights Act of 1964, Title VII, codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e) et seq.  Friedman himself 
criticized the trend toward antidiscrimination protections for workers as “interference with the freedom of indi-
viduals to enter into voluntary contracts with one another.”  FRIEDMAN, supra note 65, at 111. 
 84. VOGEL, supra note 73, at 65. 
 85. Id. 
 86. Id. at 59, 67-69. 
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The public, it seems, was not as troubled as Friedman about identifying the social 
responsibility of business.  By the early 1970s, more than eighty percent of Americans 
polled believed that business should provide special leadership in rebuilding inner cit-
ies, eliminating racial discrimination, and wiping out poverty.87  The way to insure 
that corporations provided such leadership had become clear: reform labor law, con-
sumer protection law, and environmental law, regardless of corporate law’s fiduciary 
duties.  Granted, reforms arising in these other areas of law—the broader law of busi-
ness—did not change corporate law, and applied to all business forms, not merely 
corporations.  Nevertheless, they did amount to legal reforms that fundamentally 
shaped corporate behavior.  To understand the significance—or lack thereof—of the 
claim that corporate law is witnessing the “end of history” and of the ultimate adop-
tion of shareholder primacy, one must at least recognize that other stakeholders have 
found protection from corporate management through other areas of law. 
D. Takeovers and Stakeholders 
The debate between the proponents of shareholder primacy and those preferring 
stakeholder protection continued into the 1980s, brought to the fore by a vibrant mar-
ket for hostile takeovers.  This decade marked the emergence of the strongest theoreti-
cal defense of shareholder primacy: the nexus-of-contracts model of corporate law.  
At the same time, however, progressive-inspired ideals of stakeholder protection came 
to be further reflected in corporate law through the adoption of constituency statutes 
and the allowance of anti-takeover defenses.  Here we find, once again, reforms in 
corporate law that reflect progressive values, but achieved through the mechanism of 
expanded managerial discretion. 
Despite the broad array of limitations placed on corporate management’s deci-
sionmaking authority by social welfare laws—or perhaps because of them—corporate 
legal theory increasingly narrowed its focus to emphasize the primacy of shareholder 
value as the guiding light of the executive suite.88  Spurred by the law and economics 
movement, corporate law scholarship overwhelmingly adopted the view that a corpo-
ration was a nexus of voluntary contractual relationships among many inputs—
including shareholders, employees, creditors, consumers—each capable of relying on 
markets, rather than legal rules, to protect their interests.89  Corporate executives, ac-
cording to this theory, should seek to maximize shareholder wealth; executives who 
do otherwise will disappoint shareholders, who will sell their shares, causing share 
prices to drop and inviting a takeover.  Corporate law, under this framework—one so 
successful that it can be fairly said to dominate the field of corporate law scholar-
 
 87. See id. at 42. 
 88. Among the classics in the shareholder primacy literature are: EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 1; 
Ronald J. Gilson, A Structural Approach to Corporations: The Case Against Defensive Tactics in Tender Of-
fers, 33 STAN. L. REV. 819 (1981); Michael C. Jensen & William L. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial 
Behavior, Agency Costs, and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305 (1976); Reinier H. Kraakman, Corpo-
rate Liability Strategies and the Costs of Legal Controls, 94 YALE L.J. 857 (1984); Kenneth E. Scott, Corpora-
tion Law and the American Law Institute Corporate Governance Project, 35 STAN. L. REV. 927 (1983). 
 89. See Bainbridge, supra note 5, at 859. 
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ship90—exists to help shareholders make effective use of market mechanisms to secure 
returns on investment. 
Ironically, just as the shareholder primacy school of corporate legal thought was 
taking over in law schools, corporate law was moving, at least in part, in a direction 
more accommodating to progressive goals.  A surge in hostile takeover activity, being 
financed with debt, often led to worker layoffs and plant closings.  The resulting wide-
spread public discomfort prompted states across the nation to adopt laws that for the 
first time officially sanctioned corporate management to consider the effect of their 
decisions on stakeholders.91  Such sanction came in two forms: corporate constituency 
laws and anti-takeover defenses. 
Absent codetermination, progressive corporate lawyers found solace in the rise of 
corporate constituency statutes—laws that either required or allowed corporate man-
agement to exercise their fiduciary duties with regard to the effects on employees, cus-
tomers, and larger communities of interest.  The first constituency statute was passed 
in 1983 by Pennsylvania, followed by twenty-eight other states over the following 
decade.92  While most of these laws are permissive—allowing but not requiring direc-
tors to take into account the non-shareholder constituencies—at least one state, Con-
necticut, obliges management consideration of “interests of the corporation’s employ-
ees, customers, creditors and suppliers, and . . . community and societal considerations 
including those of any community in which any office or other facility of the corpora-
tion is located.”93  By formally attempting to broaden the corporate fiduciary duty of 
care, constituency statutes may be fairly said to embody, at least in part, the long-
standing progressive ideal of respect for the many groups necessarily impacted by 
corporate behavior. 
Even in states without constituency statutes—such as the all-important hub of cor-
porate law, Delaware—the law has evolved to effectively allow directors to consider 
factors other than shareholder value in some situations, such as defending against 
takeovers.  The landmark Delaware case of Paramount Communications v. Time held 
that Time’s directors could refuse to put a tender offer up to a shareholder vote, even 
when shareholder wealth would be maximized (at least in the short-run) by the sale.94  
In place of the profitable tender offer, made by Paramount Communications, Time’s 
directors agreed to merge their company with Warner Brothers in a deal that left 
Time’s shareholders as minority shareholders in a company heavily burdened by debt 
created by the merger.  Time’s directors argued that the Warner deal was better for the 
corporation than the Paramount deal.  According to the court, “[t]he board’s prevailing 
belief was that Paramount’s bid posed a threat to Time’s control of its own destiny 
and retention of the ‘Time Culture’”95—the latter being the company’s identification 
 
 90. See id. at 859-60. 
 91. See Eric W. Orts, Beyond Shareholders: Interpreting Corporate Constituency Statutes, 61 GEO. WASH. 
L. REV. 14, 24 (1992). 
 92. Id. at 27.  Roe puts the number of states at 40 by the 1990s.  See ROE, supra note 18, at 151. 
 93. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 33-313(e)(3) & (4). 
 94. Paramount Communications v. Time, 571 A.2d 1140, 1153 (Del. 1990). 
 95. Id. at 1148. 
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with “journalistic integrity.”96  The court upheld the directors’ decision and reasoned 
that directors have broad authority to manage the firm in accordance with their long-
term vision of what is best for the corporation.97  That authority included the power to 
adopt defensive measures in a takeover contest with the “impact on ‘constituencies’ 
other than shareholders”98 in mind.  Professor Lynn Stout, referring to the benefit to 
stakeholders of this evolution in corporate law, suggests that the “Delaware courts 
seem to have come down rather firmly on Dodd’s side of the Berle-Dodd debate.”99 
The effects of this two-pronged attack (the adoption of constituency statutes and 
the allowance of corporate takeover defenses) on shareholder primacy have neverthe-
less disappointed progressives.  While giving voice to the interests of non-shareholder 
groups—and quieting hostile takeover activity—these laws are notable mainly for the 
their legacy of expanding managerial discretion.  Like the allowance of corporate 
charitable activity, these corporate law reforms have, in the end, allowed managers to 
protect themselves in the name of protecting customers, employees, and communities 
of interest.  Now officers can use these reforms as cover for their own entrenchment in 
the seats of corporate power, further immunizing their opportunism and shirking from 
scrutiny.  If a hostile bid is made that appears to benefit shareholders, management 
can take defensive measures and claim its actions benefit employees.  If employees 
are harmed, management can claim its actions benefit customers.  If all of these 
groups complain, management can claim its actions are done to benefit a unique cor-
porate culture.  No matter what the action, there is likely to be someone for whom 
management can claim the mantle of protection.100 
Progressives should hardly be surprised by this result.  As a matter of political his-
tory, corporate executives have often been behind state anti-takeover laws. According 
to Professor Mark Roe, corporate managers pressured state legislatures to adopt pro-
tective legislation—frequently in response to specific takeover attempts on their own 
firms.101  When Minnesota’s influential Dayton Hudson Corporation, the company be-
hind the Target retail stores, itself became a target in 1987, company officials were 
able to persuade the state legislature to hold a special session that resulted, in only 
hours, in anti-takeover reform.102  Arizona-based Greyhound took a similar approach 
to combating a takeover that year.103  According to one state representative, “Grey-
hound said, ‘Jump,’ and we said ‘How high.’”104  In 2003, corporate management ex-
ercised its power again, when the Taubman family, which owns the controlling block 
of the Taubman Centers shopping mall empire, persuaded the Michigan legislature to 
 
 96. Id. at 1144 n.4. 
 97. Id. at 1153-54. 
 98. Id. at 1153. 
 99. Stout, supra note 50, at 1204. 
 100. See Stephen M. Bainbridge, In Defense of the Shareholder Wealth Maximization Norm: A Reply to 
Professor Green, 50 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1423, 1432-36 (1993) (describing the inherent defects of a multi-
fiduciary model of director/officer duties). 
 101. See ROE, supra note 18, at 161. 
 102. Id. 
 103. See id. 
 104. See id. 
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pass an anti-takeover law designed explicitly to terminate a takeover attempt by rival 
mall owners Simon Property Group and Westfield America Trust.105  This last effort 
could hardly be viewed as a victory for Michigan workers: Taubman Centers has no 
malls in the state and “only a small number of employees” there.106 
Constituency statutes and anti-takeover defenses suggest that shareholder primacy 
is far from the only value reflected in contemporary corporate law.  Stakeholders, es-
pecially employees, are explicitly recognized by constituency statutes and implicitly 
protected through anti-takeover defenses–both at the expense of shareholders.  Yet 
while constituency laws and anti-takeover defenses may be effective at discouraging 
hostile takeovers, they accomplish this feat through expanding managerial discretion, 
which has proven fraught with risks associated with opportunism. 
III 
PROGRESSIVES IN PERSPECTIVE: IMPLICATIONS 
Two potentially important implications of the brief legal history offered above and 
of the patterns that it uncovers are, first, that progressives seeking to reform corporate 
behavior in the wake of recent corporate scandals ought to be wary of changing corpo-
rate law, at least to the extent such reforms result in more managerial discretion, and 
ought to consider reforms adopted externally through the broader law of business.  
Second, corporate governance can be better understood if one incorporates into it the 
law of business, which over and above corporate law remains an important influence 
on corporate activity. 
A. Progressives and Enron: Moving Away from Corporate Law Reform 
In 2001, the operation and management of major corporations once again became 
a subject of intense public concern.  The poor accounting practices and mismanage-
ment of Enron, WorldCom, Adelphia Cable, and other public corporations renewed 
the debate over how to reign in corporate officials who are too willing to use firms to 
line their own pockets to the detriment of shareholders, workers, consumers, and 
communities.107  Congress has passed one major reform bill, Sarbanes-Oxley, and over 
thirty-five states are considering or have passed legislation to redress the failures of 
the capital markets in disciplining corporate officials.  In spite of these reforms, how-
ever, the conventional wisdom is that more needs to be done. 
What direction should future reforms take?  Lawrence Mitchell, among the lead-
ing progressive corporate scholars in the United States, offers a series of potential re-
 
 105. See Andrew Ross Sorkin, Michigan Senate Approves Change in Takeover Laws, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 19, 
2003, at C4. 
 106. Id.  Managers may be using anti-takeover defenses to benefit themselves or to benefit other stakeholder 
groups.  In Do Antitakeover Defenses Decrease Shareholder Wealth? The Ex Post/Ex Ante Valuation Problem, 
55 STAN. L. REV. 845 (2002), Lynn Stout shows how anti-takeover defenses can increase shareholder value, 
even if shareholders are denied the opportunity to sell their shares to a bidder offering a premium, by protecting 
the firm-specific investments of non-shareholder groups. 
 107. See generally FRANK PARTNOY, INFECTIOUS GREED: HOW DECEIT AND GREED CORRUPTED THE 
FINANCIAL MARKETS (2003) (detailing how opportunism and a lack of transparency in the capital markets have 
propelled recent corporate scandals). 
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forms in his new book, Corporate Irresponsibility: America’s Newest Export.108  Like 
many progressives before him, Mitchell argues that our most needed reforms must al-
ter the fundamentals of corporate law, which, in Mitchell’s view, currently force well-
meaning managers to focus too much on short term share price.  Mitchell’s proposals 
include: eliminating stockholder voting for directors, allowing boards to be self-
perpetuating; alternatively, shifting voting for directors from an annual event to one 
every five years; lengthening the period of time between required reporting of finan-
cial data; and raising taxes on short-term stock ownership.109 
[T]he key . . . is to break the bonds that tie managers to stockholders . . . . The basic idea . . . 
is to let managers manage; trust them to run their corporations in responsible and accountable 
ways, taking into account the moral and social propriety of their behavior as well as the prof-
itability of their actions.110 
In light of the history of corporate law reforms inspired by progressive ideals, one can 
see a trap that Mitchell’s proposals pose for progressives.  Expanding managerial dis-
cretion, as some past progressive corporate reform efforts have done, often liberates 
management to act opportunistically and ends up helping executives rather than em-
ployees, consumers, or larger communities of interest. 
Pursuing progressive ideals through corporate law reforms has proven less than 
satisfactory in the past, but what about reforms now outside of corporate law?  Sar-
banes-Oxley suggests one such reform that might help dissuade firms from engaging 
in questionable business practices designed merely to enhance share price: revising 
the rules of lawyers’ ethics.  Section 307 of Sarbanes-Oxley directs the Securities and 
Exchange Commission (SEC) to promulgate rules for lawyers practicing before the 
commission to report illegal managerial conduct.111  The SEC rules subsequently 
adopted require lawyers who discover wrongdoing under certain circumstances to re-
port up the ladder to a company’s board of directors.  If no remedy is found there, the 
rules permit the lawyer to report “out” to the SEC.112  The American Bar Association 
(ABA), which promulgates the Model Rules of Professional Conduct, has recently 
amended its rules to allow corporate lawyers to report violations of the law to authori-
ties.113  Many lawyers have expressed outrage at the possibility of lawyers reporting 
out, insisting that it would be a fundamental encroachment on confidentiality, the core 
duty of the attorney-client relationship.  According to former ABA President William 
G. Paul, allowing disclosure of financial fraud will turn lawyers into “policemen, 
prosecutors, judges, and regulators.”114  According to another critic, such a reporting 
rule “drives a big Mack truck through client confidentiality,”115 while others insist that 
 
 108. See generally LAWRENCE E. MITCHELL, CORPORATE IRRESPONSIBILITY: AMERICA’S NEWEST 
EXPORT (2001). 
 109. See id. at 112-64 (detailing Mitchell’s reform agenda). 
 110. Id. at 185. 
 111. See 15 U.S.C. § 7245. 
 112. See 17 C.F.R. § 205.2 (2003). 
 113. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.13 (2003). 
 114. Conference Report: American Bar Association’s Annual Meeting, 72 U.S.L.W. 2091, 2092 (2003) 
(quoting Paul’s reaction to ABA revisions of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct that mirror the SEC re-
porting requirements). 
 115. Id. at 2093. 
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it will “demean and directly undermine . . . lawyers’ prime professional responsibil-
ity.”116 
Yet these reporting requirements are far from radical.  In fact, a longstanding pro-
vision of the ABA’s own Model Rules requires trial lawyers who discover client or 
witness perjury to take remedial action, including reporting to the trial judge if neces-
sary to remedy the false testimony.117  Corporate lawyers are just objecting to having a 
similar obligation—actually, a lesser duty because they are not required to report out, 
as trial lawyers are, but are merely permitted to do so—when a client or witness lies to 
a different governmental body. 
The suggestion that the SEC could require corporate lawyers to obey similar stan-
dards as trial lawyers is not meant as a panacea to fraudulent corporate accounting and 
securities reporting.118  Rather, it is but one potential chink in the armor of managerial 
opportunism that would have to accompany other reforms outside of corporate law—
including Sarbanes-Oxley’s prohibition of accounting firms doing consulting work for 
firms they audit, regulations to limit conflicts of interest among stock analysts, pen-
sion reform to diversify 401(k)s and prevent lockups, and regulation of derivatives.119  
Reformers might also consider enacting corporate fraud laws that bar companies from 
intentionally misleading employees—much as current law bars them from misleading 
shareholders—potentially discouraging outrageous conduct like that of Enron execu-
tives who misled employees about retirement funds.120  Perhaps most promising would 
simply be to beef up the prosecution of corporate misconduct and increasing the pen-
alties attached to securities fraud. 
These suggestions are just that, and any particular proposal must be thoroughly 
vetted to ensure its potential for success.  In light of the history of progressive reforms 
of managerial behavior through corporate law, current reform efforts would do well to 
continue to look to the broader law of business. 
B. Corporate Governance Reconsidered 
According to corporate law professors Margaret Blair and Mark Roe, “[I]n recent 
years legal and finance scholars who have studied the institutions of control and gov-
ernance in large corporations have focused on the relationship between shareholders 
and managers, particularly on the problem of getting managers to act as faithful agents 
for shareholders.”121  In a recent article, professor Dalia Tsuk explains how this nar-
 
 116. See Jonathan D. Glater, A Legal Uproar Over Proposals To Regulate The Profession, N.Y. TIMES, 
Dec. 17, 2002, at C1. 
 117. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.3, cmt. 10 (2002). 
 118. There is ample reason to suspect that the SEC reporting rules themselves will not radically change the 
relationship between lawyers and their corporate clients.  See, e.g., Stephen M. Bainbridge & Christina J. John-
son, Managerialism, Legal Ethics, and Sarbanes-Oxley Section 307, 2004 MICH. ST. L. REV. 299, 315-19 
(2004). 
 119. For some early efforts, see 15 U.S.C. § 78 (2003); 17 C.F.R. § 242.500 et seq. (2003). 
 120. For a persuasive proposal, see generally Kent Greenfield, The Unjustified Absence of Federal Fraud 
Protection in the Labor Market, 107 YALE L.J. 715 (1997). 
 121. Margaret M. Blair & Mark J. Roe, Introduction, in EMPLOYEES & CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 1 (M. 
Blair & M. Roe eds., 1999). 
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row definition of corporate governance came about, tracing how “legal scholars and 
political theorists helped remove the interests of workers . . . from the core concerns of 
corporate law and theory.”122  But even if corporate law has marginalized workers—
and other stakeholders—the history offered above suggests that the law generally has 
institutionalized significant (if imperfect) protections for stakeholders against corpo-
rate management. 
Despite the common conception of corporate governance as pertaining to share-
holder-management relations, the actual decisionmaking of corporate officers is heav-
ily constrained by legal rules from outside of corporate law.  To understand what a 
corporate manager’s decision matrix looks like, one must avoid succumbing to corpo-
rate law myopia: the exclusive focus on corporate law as the body of law that deter-
mines the options available to corporate decisionmakers.123  One must take into ac-
count environmental law, labor law, civil rights law, workplace safety law, and 
pension law, lest one be left with a distorted and incomplete view of how the law ac-
tually shapes those corporate decision matrices.  Basic business decisions—whom to 
hire, which products to produce, how to produce, how to market, and how to structure 
firm finances—are all profoundly affected by the law of business, over and above the 
demands of corporate law or the capital markets.  In the nineteenth century, most of 
these basic decisions were left to the discretion of corporations; the twentieth century 
evinces a pattern of cabining that traditional discretion for the benefit of stakeholders, 
but mainly through legal rules external to corporate law.  Where federal regulation of 
business was once minimal, now it is extensive.124  One telling measure of the impact 
of the law of business is the over $200 billion in annual costs to firms of compliance 
with legal regulation.125  Discussions of corporate governance that ignore such an im-
portant constraint on corporate decision-making cannot be complete. 
Corporate legal scholarship does not entirely ignore the broader law of business.  
Contractarian scholars have long pointed to the existence of external regulation as part 
of the justification for why shareholders should be the exclusive beneficiaries of 
managerial duties under corporate law.126  Corporate law treatises often mention in 
passing that corporate governance is necessarily affected by external regulations, such 
as labor law or environmental law.127  But noticing such laws exist is not the same as 
integrated analysis and study of them, little of which has emerged in corporate law 
 
 122. Tsuk, supra note 9, at 1864. 
 123. Cf. Paul L. Caron, Tax Myopia, or Mamas Don’t Let Your Babies Grow Up to be Tax Lawyers, 13 VA. 
TAX REV. 517, 518-19 (1994) (describing “tax myopia” as the common, improper trend to view tax law as a 
self-contained body of law without reference to the other areas of law that ought to inform tax discourse). 
 124. See STEPHEN BREYER, REGULATION AND ITS REFORM 1 (1982) (noting that one measure of regulation, 
pages in the Federal Register, shows remarkable growth, from 2,599 pages in 1936 to 65,603 in 1977). 
 125. DAN BERTOZZI JR. & LEE F. BERGUNDER, BUSINESS, GOVERNMENT AND PUBLIC POLICY: CONCEPTS 
AND PRACTICES 72 (1990). 
 126. See, e.g., STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATION LAW AND ECONOMICS 428-29 (2002). 
 127. See, e.g., ROBERT CHARLES CLARK, CORPORATE LAW 30 (1986) (noting the regulatory impact on 
corporation by law other than corporate law). 
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discourse.128  Excluding the broader law of business might be justifiable as a matter of 
corporate law teaching; four units are easily filled with the doctrines relating to entity 
formation, shareholder-management relations, proxy voting, mergers, and derivative 
suits.  Lines must be drawn, and specialization demands as much. 
Integration of the broader law of business into the study of corporate governance 
reveals the pervasiveness and breadth of the regulatory determinants of corporate con-
duct.  Explanations that rest exclusively on private contracting, capital market disci-
pline, or even basic fiduciary duties explain only what happens within the boundaries 
of the law—i.e., the decisions made among lawful alternatives.  The decision-making 
space left to corporate managers by the law of business is increasingly small, and we 
will miss important trends in “corporate governance” writ large if our view is myopic.  
For example, Robert Thompson and Hillary Sale have recently argued that “the most 
visible means of regulating corporate governance” is federal securities laws, not state 
corporate law.129  Steven Bank argues that one often overlooked influence on corpo-
rate governance is federal tax law.130  Perhaps such arguments suggest that the braoder 
law of business is just that—too broad—to integrate into corporate governance discus-
sions.  But they also suggest that the broader law of business’s impact on corporate 
decision-making and management is too profound to overlook. 
One objection to integrating the larger laws of business into the corporate law dis-
course is that such laws, even if they affect corporate governance, apply to all business 
forms—from sole proprietorships to partnerships—and not specifically corporations, 
the nominal topic of corporate law.  All business entities, not merely those organized 
in the corporate form, were subject, especially in the 1960s and 1970s, to “a series of 
political setbacks without parallel in the postwar period.”131  The rapid decline of pub-
lic confidence in the social responsibility of business during this period did not differ-
entiate between corporations and other forms of big business.  Between 1968 and 
1977, the percentage of Americans who believed that “business tries to strike a fair 
balance between profits and the interests of the public” declined from 70 to 15 per-
cent.132  Accordingly, perhaps it is justified to say that reforms in the law of business 
are not really about corporations and corporate stakeholders per se.  Such a distinc-
tion, however, hardly matters to a corporate officer faced with mandatory legal rules 
that diminish her discretion over operations, employment, production, and financial 
structure—or to a shareholder whose money helps pay the annual compliance costs.  
That a legal requirement is imposed both on corporations and other businesses does 
not render the interference with corporate decision-making any less onerous. 
 
 128. See generally Carl Landauer, Beyond the Law and Economics Style: Advancing Corporate Law in an 
Era of Downsizing and Corporate Reengineering¸ 84 CAL. L. REV. 1693 (1996) (noting that progressive corpo-
rate lawyers have tended to ignore environmental and labor law’s impact on corporate governance). 
 129. Robert B. Thompson & Hillary A. Sale, Securities Fraud as Corporate Governance: Reflections Upon 
Federalism, 56 VAN. L. REV. 859, 860 (2003). 
 130. See Steven A. Bank, Tax, Corporate Governance, and Norms, 61 WASH. & LEE L. REV. (forthcoming 
2004).  See also, Marjorie E. Kornhauser, Corporate Regulations and the Origin of the Corporate Income Tax, 
66 IND. L. J. 53 (1990). 
 131. VOGEL, supra note 73, at 59. 
 132. See id. at 7.   
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Moreover, most big business is corporate in form and the corporation has long 
served as the symbolic embodiment of American business.133  Even if employee-, cus-
tomer-, and community-protective laws apply to all business forms, corporations are 
generally the intended target.  In the 1960s, progressive activists such as Staughton 
Lynd argued that “[o]ur inevitable enemy . . . is the corporation.”134  In 1971, the more 
mainstream voice of Newsweek recognized that similar public sentiment stretched well 
beyond the New Left.  In a cover story entitled “The American Corporation Under 
Fire,” the magazine detailed the pressures on corporations to ameliorate the quality of 
life for their worker, consumer, and community stakeholders.135  Although corporate 
stakeholders are not the only ones to benefit from such public outrage with the corpo-
ration, protective legislation provides them with new protections nonetheless.  And 
corporate decision-makers remain constrained to act in stakeholders’ interests by 
mandatory legal rules, even if those rules apply to other business forms, too. 
The notion of the corporation as a symbolic embodiment of big business partially 
answers the inevitable question why stakeholder protection was not adopted primarily 
through corporate law, rather than through the broader law of business.  Another part 
of the answer is institutional: the federal government was the source of the most sig-
nificant reforms, and corporate law is state law.  Congress did not have jurisdiction 
over state corporate law to create managerial obligations to stakeholders.  Such juris-
diction would have required initial legislation federalizing incorporation, which has 
never proven politically successful.  Although the 1970s saw a predictable resurgence 
of the age-old push for federal incorporation, this wave, like the one Theodore Roose-
velt rode in the early twentieth century,136 quickly petered out. 
Congress and surrogate administrative agencies followed Roosevelt’s lead and 
regulated corporations through other bodies of law, where federal authority was more 
firm.  Congress could not require state corporations to grant employees a voice in op-
erations or a vote for directors, but it could require businesses to engage in collective 
bargaining with employees under strict rules granting employees rights traditionally 
denied to them under state law.  Unionized employees thus gained a voice in corporate 
governance.  Congress could not require state corporations to favor community inter-
ests over those of shareholders, but it could mandate that businesses not discharge ex-
cessive toxic material into the environment.  Communities thus gained protection from 
corporate officials’ tendency to increase profits by polluting.  In this case, stakeholder 
voice was exercised through public law, not negotiation with management or a formal 
vote for directors.137  Perhaps even more significant for political development, these 
 
 133. See PETER F. DRUCKER, CONCEPT OF THE CORPORATION 6 (1946) (contending that the large corpora-
tion is “the institution which sets the standard for the way of life and the mode of living of our citizens; which 
leads, molds, and directs; . . . around which crystallize our social problems and to which we look for their solu-
tion.”) 
 134. Quoted in VOGEL, supra note 73, at 57. 
 135. The American Corporation Under Fire, NEWSWEEK, May 24, 1971, at 74. 
 136. See MARTIN J. SKLAR, THE CORPORATE RECONSTRUCTION OF AMERICAN CAPITALISM, 1890-1916 §§ 
192-202 (1988) (analyzing the progressive era movement for federal incorporation). 
 137. Similarly, campaign finance law has sought to protect shareholders from managerial decisions to use 
firm funds to support political candidates.  Again, the protection comes from outside of corporate law, but its 
aim of protecting shareholders is well illustrated by the history leading up to the first federal campaign finance 
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laws effectively achieved the federalization of corporate governance law—at least 
significant parts of it—and accomplished indirectly what Roosevelt was unable to do 
directly. 
To say that stakeholders found protection in the broader law of business does not 
mean that all such laws run contrary to the profit-seeking interests of shareholders.  To 
the contrary, through much of the twentieth century, government and business have 
cooperated and symbiotically grown together.138  In fact, regulation often ends up 
serving the interests of shareholders or managers, even if it is originally justified as 
serving other stakeholders.139  Moreover, it is usually a mistake to assume that the in-
terests of shareholders are necessarily antagonistic to those of other stakeholders.140  
Shareholders benefit from public regulation that makes stakeholder contributions of 
capital—human or otherwise—more reliable and less subject to arbitrary management 
decisions. 
Public regulation also has several features that make it attractive as a means of 
protecting the interests of stakeholders: First, straightforward changes in corporate law 
are subject to evasion by investors choosing alternative business forms, such as lim-
ited liability partnerships.  Second, mandatory rules imposed from without are more 
durable than contractual bargains subject to future negotiation.  Third, granting em-
ployees a formalized voice in corporate governance through the mechanisms available 
to shareholders—such as voting for directors or expanded fiduciary duties—might not 
prove effective;141 indeed, shareholders themselves often find that voting power and 
fiduciary principles provide little bulwark against management.142  Finally, enacting 
stakeholder protection through the law of business rather than corporate law may be 
more efficient.143  Public regulation is far from perfect, of course; the deadweight loss 
tied to interest group capture, log-rolling politics, and other pathologies of lawmaking 
takes away from the benefits that accrue to corporate stakeholders.144  Whether one 
prefers public regulation to markets or vice versa, the pattern of stakeholder-protective 
legislation interfering with corporate decision-making is clear. 
In Robert Charles Clark’s Corporate Law treatise, the author justifies his decision 
to omit the broader law of business—even while noting its obvious impact on corpo-
rate governance—on the ground that “traditionally, the subject of corporation law and 
 
law regulating corporations, the Tillman Act of 1907.  See Adam Winkler, “Other People’s Money”: Corpora-
tions, Agency Costs, and Campaign Finance Law, 92 GEO. L. J. (forthcoming 2004) (detailing how the Tillman 
Act, and other campaign finance laws, are partially based on the idea of protecting shareholders from manage-
rial corruption). 
 138. See Ballam, supra note 78, at 621-24, 635 (1994). 
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Steven Bank, Corporate Managers, Agency Costs, and the Rise of Double Taxation, 44 WM. & MARY L. REV. 
167 (2002) (discussing double taxation of corporate earnings). 
 140. See Stout, supra note 50, at 1196. 
 141. See BAINBRIDGE supra note 126, at  429 (“By virtue of their inherent ambiguity, fiduciary duties are a 
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note 50, at 1191. 
 143. See BAINBRIDGE, supra note 126, at 428-29. 
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securities laws are simply defined to deal only with relationships between sharehold-
ers and managers (directors and officers).”145  Corporate law, then, only purports to 
address only shareholder/management issues and not every conceivable law that influ-
ences, even profoundly, corporate behavior.  If Clark’s treatise is accurate that corpo-
rate law self-consciously limits its focus to shareholder/management relations, we can 
better understand the emptiness of claims that corporate law’s history is at an end and 
that shareholder primacy has won out over the progressive school.  If corporate law is, 
by definition, only about shareholders and management, then there is no space in it for 
a discussion of restraints on corporate governance adopted in the name of stakeholder 
protection and enforced through mandatory legal regimes other than corporate law. 
Of course such restraints still exist.  Their impact on corporate management is not 
transformed or minimized by their categorization as labor law or environmental law 
rather than corporate law.  To the extent corporate law, so narrowly defined, favors 
shareholders and default rules over stakeholders and mandatory rules, it is largely due 
to this artificial distinction between legal regimes affecting corporate management that 
essentially defines progressives out of the game.  There is little wonder progressives 
are thought to be losing battles over the corporation. 
IV 
CONCLUSION 
It is not hard to imagine why conservative corporate lawyers claim to have van-
quished all of the non-shareholder-centered schools of thought in corporate law.  
Much of the body of laws included in corporate law textbooks and in corporations 
codes—though certainly not all of it—emphasizes the centrality of shareholders to 
corporate governance and corporate operational practices, while ignoring manage-
ment’s responsibilities to workers, consumers, and larger communities of interest.  If 
one teaches from those books year-in and year-out, it is easy to believe that corpora-
tions are run primarily, if not exclusively, to benefit shareholders and that, as Fried-
man concluded, the social responsibility of business is solely to make profit.146 
Yet progressive concern with the social responsibility of business—protecting 
stakeholders—has been much more successful than corporate lawyers usually recog-
nize.  Corporate law has not really reached consensus around the value of shareholder 
primacy, but has evolved to permit corporate charitable contributions and to expand 
fiduciary duties through constituency statutes.  While these progressive-inspired re-
forms of corporate law have benefited their intended subjects—companies give bil-
lions to charity and hostile takeover activity has been nearly eliminated—such reforms 
have also opened the door for new forms of managerial opportunism.  Consequently, 
progressives ought to think carefully about protecting employees, customers, and 
communities through corporate law reforms, at least where managerial autonomy is 
augmented. 
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 146. See supra notes 65-68 and accompanying text. 
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Once one looks beyond the corporate law codes and the corporations casebooks, 
one finds that businesses already face numerous legal requirements to protect non-
shareholder constituencies.  In the 1920s and 1930s, securities laws and collective 
bargaining laws were adopted to protect the American economy and its workers from 
the corruption of Wall Street.  In the 1960s, a great blossoming of legislative reform 
was enacted to restrain corporate management and serve the interests of stakeholders: 
consumer protection laws, environmental laws, antidiscrimination laws, and occupa-
tional safety laws.  These areas of law continue to thrive—despite their details varying 
with shifts in the prevailing political winds—and remain non-trivial constraints on 
corporate management. 
Stakeholder protection and corporate social responsibility are alive and well in the 
United States.  But to see the full extent of these progressive ideals, one has to look 
outside of corporate law as it is traditionally defined, and look to the broader law of 
business.  It is only by ignoring the success of progressives that one could conclude 
that corporate law’s history is at an end, and perhaps the only meaningful lesson of 
such claims is that they rest on an artificially narrow understanding of corporate gov-
ernance.  Surely, corporate managers themselves, who must operate within the broader 
law of business, are aware of the legally imposed duties to protect workers, consum-
ers, and larger communities.  Perhaps it is time corporate lawyers—conservative and 
progressive alike—caught up to this reality. 
 
